It has recently been shown that incorporating "keeping up with the Joneses"preferences into a prototypical two-ability-type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high-skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents'utility functions are postulated to exhibit "habit formation in consumption" such that the prototypical two-ability-type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future …scal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not a¤ect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot pre-commit, the high-skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low-skill type's marginal tax rate remains positive.
Introduction
There is now an extensive literature that examines the macroeconomic e¤ects of "keeping up with the Joneses" and/or "habit formation in consumption" preferences within dynamic general equilibrium models; see recent examples of Carroll [2000] , Ljungqvist and Uhlig [2000] , Dupor and Liu [2003] , Alonso-Carrera, et al. [2004] , and Guo [2005] .
A "keeping up with the Joneses"utility speci…cation captures the idea that individuals may evaluate their own consumption relative to that of their neighbours, thus individual consumption imposes a negative externality on others. On the other hand, "habit formation in consumption"preferences imply that individuals evaluate their current consumption relative to their own past consumption, hence increases in current consumption will, ceteris paribus, reduce the utility from future consumption. The popularity of these preference formulations follows from their success in explaining various macroeconomic phenomena such as business cycle ‡uctuations (Lettau and Uhlig [2000] ), the interrelations between savings and economic growth ) and the equity premium puzzle (Abel [1990 (Abel [ , 1999 , Constantinides [1990] , Gali [1994] and Campbell and Cochrane [1999] ), among others.
In the …eld of public economics, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] recently have introduced "keeping up with the Joneses"preferences to a prototypical two-abilitytype Mirrlees/Stiglitz model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. 1 In the standard framework, agents derive utility only from their own consumption, and the government seeks to redistribute from the high-skill to the low-skill type. However, since an individual's skill type is assumed to be private information, the government cannot implement (the …rst-best) personalised lump-sum taxes. Instead, the government is constrained to use (the second-best) incentive-compatible taxation in which individuals are willing to reveal their skill types. In this case, it is well known that the optimal incentivecompatible tax system is characterised by a zero marginal tax rate on the high-skill type together with a positive marginal tax rate on the low-skill type, where the latter is used to distort the low-skill type's labour supply downwards to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. By considering a "keeping up with the Joneses" utility function within this setting, 2 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] provide another justi…cation for marginal tax-rate distortions, namely, a corrective motive to overturn the e¤ects of a negative consumption externality. These authors show that "keeping up with the Joneses"preferences lead to higher optimal marginal tax rates than in the conventional case, hence both types of agents face positive marginal tax rates. The intuition for higher marginal tax rates is to distort the labour supply of both types downwards, thereby lowering aggregate income and consumption, which in turn attenuates the e¤ects of negative consumption externalities.
This paper complements Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman's [2008a] analysis by in-
corporating "habit formation in consumption" preferences -where an agent's utility depends on the di¤erence between her current consumption and a fraction of the past level of her own consumption -into a prototypical two-ability-type nonlinear income tax model. Since consumption habits turn the standard model into an intertemporal setting, we examine a dynamic economy with two time periods. 3 Although an in…nite-horizon formulation might be considered more general, our two-period framework allows the results to be derived in a clear and intuitive manner. Moreover, the …rst period of our two-period model is su¢ cient to capture the essential problem of dynamic taxation.
That is, when choosing its present tax policy, the government must consider how its choices a¤ect its taxation possibilities in the future. 4 Our main results can be summarised as follows: (i) If in the …rst period the government can commit to its second-period tax policy, habit formation in consumption exerts 2 In particular, an agent's utility depends on the di¤erence between her own consumption and a fraction of the contemporaneous level of average consumption in the economy. 3 Brett and Weymark [2008] . Our model is therefore most closely related to that of Apps and Rees [2006] , although methodologically our analysis is closer to Brett and Weymark [2008] . 4 In a recent paper, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008b] consider habit formation in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which is quite di¤erent to the prototypical Mirrlees/Stiglitz nonlinear income tax framework. They also consider only the case when the government can commit to its future tax policy, while our focus is on the case when the government cannot commit. no impact on the standard results that the high-skill type should face a zero marginal tax rate and the low-skill type should face a positive marginal tax rate. This is because the consumers rationally consider the e¤ects on their second-period utility when deciding their …rst-period consumption levels. Hence, there is no need for the government to implement marginal tax-rate distortions to correct the negative "internality"that an individual's …rst-period consumption imposes on their second-period utility. (ii) If the government cannot commit to its second-period tax policy, the presence of consumption habits lowers the marginal tax rate faced by the high-skill agents, meaning they now face a negative marginal tax rate, whereas habit formation raises the low-skill type's marginal tax rate, which means it remains positive. As in the commitment case, there is still no corrective motive for marginal tax-rate distortions; but when the government cannot pre-commit, consumption habits yield di¤erent optimal marginal tax rates to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. Therefore, while Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] show that "keeping up with the Joneses"preferences move the recommendations of optimal tax theory closer to actual practice by providing a rationale for a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill workers, we show that "habit formation in consumption"cannot help reconcile optimal tax theory with real-world …scal systems.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our two-period model economy. Section 3 examines optimal income taxation with commitment, and Section 4 examines optimal income taxation without commitment. Section 5 discusses the implications of considering a "catching up with the Joneses"preference speci…cation in our model. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. Proofs and other mathematical details are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a simple two-period model with a continuum of consumers of unit measure, with a proportion 2 (0; 1) being high-skill workers and the remaining (1 ) being low-skill workers. Consumption by a type i consumer (i = 1, 2) in period t which is used to evaluate the utility of consumption in period 2. The second-period utility function corresponds to the typical habit-formation model as speci…ed, e.g., by
Alonso-Carrera, et al. [2004] . The parameter 2 (0; 1) measures the importance of …rst-period consumption in evaluating the second-period level of utility. Since > 0, a ceteris paribus increase in the …rst-period consumption reduces the second-period utility, thus a negative "internality"is present.
It is well known that in models with a …nite number of types, the optimal income tax schedule may not be di¤erentiable. We therefore follow the standard practice of deriving expressions for "implicit" marginal tax rates in terms of derivatives of the utility function. To this end, suppose the consumers face smooth nonlinear income tax functions T 1 (y Guesnerie [1995] calls "redistributive equilibria", as the redistributive goals of the government imply that the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint binds, whereas the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint is always slack. 8 It is shown in the Appendix that the solution to programme (3:1) (3:4) yields:
Proposition 1 When the government is able to commit to its second-period tax policy, optimal nonlinear income taxation under habit formation in consumption is characterised
The presence of habit formation therefore has no e¤ect on the pattern of optimal marginal tax rate distortions when the government can pre-commit. The intuition is quite straightforward: since the consumers take into account how their …rst-period consumption a¤ects their second-period utility, there is no need for the government to engage in corrective taxation. Hence, the only motive the government has to implement marginal tax-rate distortions is the same as that in the standard model, i.e., to distort the lowskill type's labour supply downwards to relax the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. 7 As with the consumers, we do not permit the government to save. 8 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] also make this assumption.
Optimal Income Taxation without Commitment
If the government cannot commit to its second-period tax policy, the government can use skill-type information revealed in period 1 to implement (the …rst-best) personalised lump-sum taxes in period 2. In this case, the government's behaviour in period 2 can be described as follows. Choose hc is the government's …rst-period budget constraint, while (4.5) is type 2's incentivecompatibility constraint. Since type-2 consumers know that they will be subjected to the …rst-best taxation in period 2 if they reveal their skill type in period 1, they must be o¤ered a relatively favourable tax treatment in period 1 to compensate for the relatively unfavourable tax treatment they will receive in period 2. 9 Consequently, in order for a type-2 consumer to be willing to reveal her skill type in period 1, the utility she obtains from choosing hc 
she is announcing to the government that she is a low-skill worker and will therefore be treated as such in the second period.
It is shown in the Appendix that the solutions to programmes (4:1) (4:2) and , so the government can raise the second-period social welfare by transferring a small amount of consumption from type-1 to type-2 consumers. Thus under the …rst-best taxation in period 2, an individual's utility is increasing in own 9 Indeed, the favourable tax treatment o¤ered high-skill consumers in period 1 to obtain skill-type information could be very costly from a social welfare point of view. Instead, it is theoretically possible that the government may prefer to pool some or all of the high-skill consumers with the low-skill consumers in period 1 so that skill-type information is not revealed, even though it is then constrained to use the second-best taxation in period 2. However, we focus only on the more economically interesting case in which the high-skill and low-skill consumers all receive di¤erent tax treatments. 10 See equations (A.24) and (A.26) in the Appendix.
…rst-period consumption. 11 It follows that the government can increase type-2's secondperiod utility by raising their …rst-period consumption. This is achieved through a negative marginal tax rate to distort type-2's …rst-period labour supply upwards, which in turn generates additional income that can be used to increase type-2's …rst-period consumption. The reason the government wants to raise the utility type-2 consumers obtain under the …rst-best taxation in period 2 is that it makes them more willing to reveal their skill type in period 1, i.e., it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint.
Moreover, the increase in type 2's second-period utility necessitates a reduction in type 1's second-period utility, which further serves to make mimicking less attractive and relax the incentive-compatibility constraint.
The …rst-period marginal tax rate faced by type-1 consumers is positive as in the standard framework, but now there are three factors at work. First, the government wants to distort type-1 workers' …rst-period labour supply downwards for the same reasons as in the prototypical setting. Second, habit formation implies that the government wants to distort type 1's …rst-period labour supply downwards to lower their …rst-period income and consumption, since this reduces the utility they obtain in period 2 under the …rst-best taxation (recall that individual utility in period 2 is increasing in own …rst-period consumption). This makes mimicking less attractive, thus relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint. Third, the decrease in type-1's second-period utility comes with an increase in type-2's second-period utility, making type-2 consumers more willing to reveal their type which again relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint.
As a result, all three factors act to make it optimal for the government to distort type 1's …rst-period labour supply downwards, which implies a positive marginal tax rate.
We conclude this section with two comments. First, the preceding discussion makes it clear that the only motive the government has to implement marginal tax-rate distortions is to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. As in the commitment case, there is no role for any form of corrective taxation. Second, habit formation lowers the marginal tax 11 While this might seem counter-intuitive, it is similar to the standard result that individual utility under the …rst-best taxation is decreasing in the wage rate, since all individuals receive the same level of consumption, but higher-wage individuals are required to work longer. rate faced by the high-skill type, but raises the marginal tax rate faced by the low-skill type. Therefore, unlike Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] with "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences, habit formation exerts opposite e¤ects on the high-skill and low-skill type's optimal marginal tax rates.
Discussion
In Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a], individuals evaluate their current consumption relative to contemporaneous average consumption in the economy. This class of preferences is known as "keeping up with the Joneses". By contrast, "catching up with the Joneses"postulates that an individual's current consumption is compared with past levels of average consumption. As a result, similar to the speci…cation with habit formation, there exists intertemporal dependence between consumptions at di¤erent time periods. Here, we use our dynamic two-period model to examine the "catching up"case in which consumer i's objective function is given by:
where c 1 represents the economy's period-1 average consumption.
The main results can be summarised as follows: 12 (i) When the government can pre-commit, the standard optimal marginal tax rate results apply in period 2 simply because this is the last period and contemporaneous consumption does not generate an externality. In period 1, however, both the high-skill and low-skill types face higher marginal tax rates than in the prototypical model for the same corrective-motive reasons a la Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] . Hence, it makes no di¤erence whether one works with "catching up" or "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences when the government can commit to its future tax policy.
(ii) When the government cannot pre-commit, both types of agents face a zero marginal tax rate in period 2 as this is the last period, the …rst-best taxation is possible, and contemporaneous consumption 12 The detailed derivations for these results are available upon request.
does not generate an externality. In period 1, however, the marginal tax rates faced by both types cannot be signed. On the one hand, the government wants to impose higher marginal tax rates to reduce …rst-period consumption and correct the e¤ects of consumption externalities as in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] . But on the other hand, the government wants to lower marginal tax rates to raise …rst-period consumption to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint for reasons similar as to why it does so under habit formation. Since the corrective and incentive motives for marginal tax-rate distortions work in opposite directions under "catching up with the Joneses" when the government cannot pre-commit, the optimal marginal tax rates cannot be signed.
Concluding Comments
By introducing "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences to a prototypical optimal nonlinear income tax model, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [2008a] have moved the recommendations of normative tax theory closer to the characteristics of real-world tax systems, in that a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill workers can be justi…ed.
In this paper, we have incorporated a closely-related class of preferences, known as "habit formation in consumption", into the standard two-ability-type optimal nonlinear income tax framework. Our analysis shows that consumption habits a¤ects the conventional results only if the government cannot commit to its future tax policy, which raises the question as to whether governments can pre-commit in practice. On the one hand, one could argue that the commitment assumption is justi…ed by the observation that realworld income tax schedules are not frequently redesigned. 13 On the other hand, the no-commitment assumption might be justi…ed by the fact that the present government cannot impose binding constraints on future governments. 14 Moreover, the secondbest nature of the standard optimal nonlinear income tax framework stems from the 13 Gaube [2007] makes this argument. 14 For example, Auerbach [2006] cites a proposal regarding the problem of the U.S. Social Security system's imbalance, which includes a tax increase to be made in 2045. As Auerbach suggests, it is highly unlikely that the government presiding in 2045 will feel constrained by a decision taken by another government over 40 years earlier.
assumption that skill types are private information. But taxation in earlier periods may result in this information being revealed, which would enable the government to implement the …rst-best (lump-sum) taxation in latter periods. Hence, ruling out lumpsum taxes in a dynamic nonlinear income tax model via a commitment assumption might be considered somewhat arti…cial. In any event, our results show that habit formation in consumption, regardless of whether the government can commit or not, cannot help reconcile optimal tax theory with the tax systems observed in practice. Unlike "keeping up with the Joneses"preferences, the feature of habit formation, if anything, moves the recommendations of optimal tax theory further away from the observed practice.
Appendix Derivation of Equations (2.4) and (2.5)
The Lagrangian corresponding to programme (2:1) (2:3) can be written as: 
Straightforward manipulation of (A.2) and (A.3) yields equation (2.4), while straightforward manipulation of (A.4) and (A.5) yields equation (2.5).
Proof of Proposition 1
The relevant …rst-order conditions corresponding to programme (3:1) (3:4) are: Dividing (A.13) by (A.12) and rearranging yields: : (A.17)
Therefore, (A.16) and (A.17) imply that:
Using (A.12) and (A.10), it follows that 1 2 > 0. Hence, (A.18) can be rearranged to yield:
which using (2.5) establishes that M T R 2 1 > 0. Using (A.6) and (A.7), we obtain: 
Hence, (A.22) can be rearranged to yield: 
Proof of Proposition 2
The …rst-order conditions corresponding to programme (4:1) (4:2) are: ( 1 1 2 )u 0 (c By the Envelope Theorem: . Therefore, the last term in (A.48) is also positive.
